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Converting a philosophy into practice is a challenge. Recent
IWRM experiences in developing countries present a case in
point. At the operational level, they take a rather narrow
view of the concept and have largely tended to be introduced
as a blueprint package. The key to successful IWRM
implementation is integration—of the local resources and
in the local context.
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Developing countries like India are actively being encouraged to move from the traditional supply-side
orientation towards proactive demand management under the broad framework of Integrated Water
Resources Management (IWRM). Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) is a sound philosophy
which is hard to disagree with. However, in developing countries, what usually gets passed-off in the name
of IWRM at the operational level takes a rather narrow view of the philosophy and has largely tended to
include a blue-print package including: [1] A national water policy; [2] A water law and regulatory
framework; [3] Recognition of River Basin as the appropriate unit of water and land resources planning
and management; [4] Treating water as an economic good; and [5] Participatory water resource
management.
Several of these mark a significant shift from current paradigms and making this transition is proving to be
difficult. Drafting new water laws is easy; enforcing them is not. Renaming regional water departments as
basin organizations is easy; but managing water resources at basin level is not. Declaring water an
economic good is simple; but using price mechanisms to direct water to high-value uses is proving complex.
As a consequence, the so-called IWRM initiatives in developing country contexts have proved to be
ineffective at best and counterproductive at worst.
The  uniquely  informal  nature  of
developing  country  water  economies
Water economies in developing countries are largely
informal with little interface with any public institution.
Reform efforts focussed mainly on direct regulation
and management overestimate the capacity of legal
provisions and formal institutions to influence water
use patterns.
Water institutions that exist in a country or can be
expected to be successfully catalyzed by external actors
depend, among other things, on the stage of formalization
of its water economy which in turn depends upon the
overall economic evolution of that country. Water sectors
transform from being highly informal in poorly
developed economies to more formalized ones as the
national economies grow. By formalization, we mean the
proportion of the economy that comes under the ambit
of direct regulatory influence.
In informal water economies like that of India, water
users depend heavily on self-provision, informal
exchanges and local community institutions that are
not under the direct influence of formal public
institutions. On the other hand, in highly formalized
water economies of industrialized countries or, to some
extent, in urban India, self-provision is marginal or
completely absent as most users are served by public
or private service providers who form the interface
between the users and the regulators or policymakers.
Such highly formalized economies are amenable to
direct policy and regulatory measures like volumetric
pricing and allocation which become infeasible and
impractical in largely informal water economies.
Several surveys (Box 1) have shown that India’s rural
water economy – both domestic and irrigation use – is
predominantly informal. It is based largely on self-supply
and local, informal water institutions. It has little connect
with public systems and formal organizations through
which the policies, laws and water administration
typically operate in industrialized countries.
This Water Policy Briefing is based on research presented in Issues in Reforming Informal Water Economies of Low-
Income Countries: Examples from India and Elsewhere by Tushaar Shah [In: Van Koppen, Barbara, John Butterworth,
and Mark Giordano (Eds). ‘Community-based water law and water resources management reform in developing
countries’, Oxford: CABI publishers]; and Is India Ripe for Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM): Fitting Water
Policy to National Development Context by Tushaar Shah and Barbara van Koppen [Economic and Political Weekly,





2 January, 2007Transformation  of  informal  water
economies
The figure hypothesizes how the organization of a
country’s water economy metamorphoses in response
to economic growth and the transformation of society
that comes in its wake. Regardless of its water
endowments, as a low-income economy climbs up the
economic ladder, the organization of its water economy
undergoes a transformation in tandem with the
transformation of the society as a whole.
The foremost drivers of this transformation are
urbanization and occupational diversification. As the
proportion of rural and agrarian population declines,
agricultural water demand eases. With urbanization and
economic growth, self-provision of water is
increasingly replaced by service providers. Along with
these changes, water institutions too undergo profound
change. In very poor societies, self-provision of water
by households is ubiquitous. Countries at somewhat
higher levels of economic growth witness limited local
specialization in water services provision, in an
Box 1. Nature of India’s Water Economy
A nationwide survey covering 78,990 households in 5,110 villages showed that less than 10 percent of survey households
used water from sources owned and managed by the government. Further, less than 20 percent of rural households
were connected with any public or community water supply system and only one in every 12 villages has any public
or community water supply system. The rest rely on self-provision for their domestic water needs.
However, this evidence on domestic water supply was not uniform across the nation and a strong influence of
economic growth could be seen. The proportion of villages with a public water supply system increases rapidly as
we move from poor to richer states. In Bihar, one of India’s poorest states, none of the 364 villages surveyed had a
public/community water supply; in the somewhat richer state of Haryana, over half the villages surveyed had a
public water supply system, and in still richer Goa, every village surveyed had a public water supply system.
The picture is similar in the irrigation sector. A 2002 survey of 4,646 villages across the country found that 76 percent
of the villages reported some irrigation but only 17 percent had access to a public irrigation system; the rest depended
primarily on wells, tube wells, tanks and streams. Two-thirds of all farmers in a large survey reported using irrigation
for five major field crops cultivated by them. For half of them, the source of irrigation was the informal and fragmented
pump irrigation markets which are totally outside the ambit of direct influence of the formal institutions.
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local specialization and the informal institutions
associated with these disappear and large,
professionally run corporates (public or privately
owned) take over the role of procurement, processing
and retailing of water.
Institutional  environment  versus
institutional  arrangements
The Institutional Environment (IE) refers to the ‘three
pillars’ of formal water laws, water administration
(including donors, academia and NGOs) and formal
water policy. Institutional Arrangements (IA), in contrast,
refer to the humanly devised rules-in-use, which drives
the working of numerous informal institutions that keep
a vibrant economy well lubricated. These would therefore
include entities like groundwater markets, water user
associations, urban tanker markets etc. The level of
formalization of a country’s water sector is best indicated
by the limited interaction between its water IE and IA.
Much analysis and interventions currently focusses
on what governments, bureaucracies and legal and
regulatory systems do. To be effective in developing
countries, it should also include people, businesses, civil
society institutions and religious and social movements.
Understanding the rules-in-use
An important question in understanding institutions
is: ‘Why do economies fail to undertake appropriate
activities even when they have a potentially high pay-off?’
India’s water sector is replete with situations where
appropriate activities can potentially generate a high pay-
off and yet fail to get undertaken. In contrast, much of
the water reforms being attempted or contemplated are
unlikely to work in the current context because of high
transaction costs (these include: [1] costs of search and
information; [2] costs of negotiation, bargaining and
contracting; and [3] costs of policing and enforcement
of property rights, rules and laws).
The transaction costs of an intervention increase with
an increase in the number of stakeholders. State agencies
therefore regularly try to minimize transaction costs
while designing and implementing institutional
interventions. The new water law in Mexico (See Box 2),
for instance, does not apply to anyone who stores less
than 1030 m3 of water. Australia’s water law excludes
users who irrigate less than 2 ha. Kansas water law
exempts all who divert less than 15 acre feet of water.
Water withdrawal permits in South Africa and many
African countries exclude domestic users and stock
watering. Including these small users would hugely
increase search, information and enforcement costs
involved in implementing the interventions. But if India
or Bangladesh were to exempt those who irrigate 2 ha or
less, a majority of their water users and water diversion
would get excluded. And if these were included, the
transaction costs of regulating would skyrocket.
When transaction costs of implementing an
institutional intervention become prohibitive, players
in IE give it up rather than enforcing it at any cost. In
some cases, as in Mexico, state agencies come up with
smart indirect approaches to reduce transaction costs.
Economizing on transaction costs is thus a key
determinant of the nature of institutional
arrangements that evolve.
Transaction Costs and Perceived Pay-Offs
Several kinds of institutional reforms tried or
suggested in the Indian context have tended to have
either entailed high transaction costs or low pay-offs
or both. In contrast, institutional changes which have
Box 2. The New Groundwater Law in Mexico
Mexico’s experience with implementing its new
groundwater law is an interesting example of how
transaction costs guide policy behavior, influence the
institutional environment and determine the
institutional arrangements.
Much like India and China, Mexico also faces the
problem of groundwater over-exploitation in some
parts. Its new Law of the Nation’s Water  provided
for the registration of all groundwater diverters and
issue of  ‘concessions’ to each with an entitlement to
pump a permitted quota of water per year. Nearly a
decade later, the ‘implementation efficacy’ of this
policy regime has varied across different segments
of groundwater diverters.
The law was enforced quickly and effectively for
industrial users and municipalities – large users in
the formal sector; household wells – far too
numerous, and each diverting small quantities – were
wisely kept out of the ambit of the law. The reason
was apparent – the high transaction costs of
regulating them. As there are over 96,000 agricultural
users, the real problem faced by Mexico’s water
bureaucracy is the impossibility of enforcing
volumetric restrictions with limited staff and
resources. Attempts to reduce policing costs by
instituting peer monitoring systems – COTAS or
Aquifer Management Councils – have also not
worked. The enormity of the task can be imagined in
India where a similar strategy would require policing
more than 20 million private tubewell owners
scattered over 600,000 villages.
Unable to police a large number of individual users
through its water bureaucracy or through the COTAS,
the government in Mexico finally enforced penal
charges for electricity use by tubewells extracting
groundwater beyond their allocation. This method
reduced transaction costs since metered electricity
use provides a good surrogate of water extracted.
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transaction costs low are either thwarted or, at least,
ignored and not built upon.
Interventions  with  poor
implementation  efficacy
(Quadrants III and IV)
International pressure and donor conditionalities
sometimes oblige developing countries to initiate
interventions without a local buy-in. There is a whole
set of policy proposals widely espoused by researchers
and donors and attempted by policymakers that
have doubtful potential pay-off in a predominantly
informal water economy like India because of the
prohibitively high enforcement costs. When policing
thoughts. The concerns are of four kinds: [a] most
reforms have remained largely unimplemented,
especially in the informal segments of the water
economy that encompasses most of the users and uses;
[b] implementation of reforms has disrupted
customary arrangements for water management; [c]
when zealously implemented, reforms – especially,
water permits and water taxes – hit poor people in
remote rural areas hard; and [d] ‘demand management
reforms’ deflected policymakers from pursuing other
important water-sector priorities, viz., improving water
infrastructure and services.
Promising  but  transaction  costly
interventions (Quadrant II)
Some interventions promise high pay-offs if
successful; but their success is rare because they are
based on institutional models with high transaction
costs. A classic example is Participatory Irrigation
Management (PIM), or its cousin Irrigation
Management Transfer (IMT). There has been high
enthusiasm for PIM driven by its communitarian ideal
and a few examples of its successful implementation
on an experimental scale. What is often overlooked is
that success has always been a result of extraordinary
levels of facilitation that cannot be easily replicated or
upscaled. Yet the islands of excellence have been the
basis for several large scale irrigation reforms programs
over the past few decades.
A careful analysis of IMT programs across the
world suggets that they work better where:
• The irrigation system is central to a dynamic,
high-performing agriculture.
• The average farm size is large enough for a typical
command area farmer to operate like agri-
businessmen.
• Supply of water resources is just sufficient to meet
the demand requirements in the given command.
• The farm producers are linked with global input
and output markets.
• The costs of self-managed irrigation are an
insignificant part of the gross value of the product
of farming.
These are the conditions that increase the pay-offs
and reduce transaction costs of community management
of irrigation systems. We find these conditions in high
and middle income countries like USA, New Zealand,
Mexico and even among the commercial white farmers
of South Africa, countries where most of the success
stories of IMT come from. Command areas in India (and
other low-income economies) have a large proportion
of small and marginal farmers growing mostly low-value
cereal crops. Even though irrigation is central to the
and enforcement costs of an intervention are high, there
is a tendency to design interventions as a token, without
serious intention to implement them. The Government
of India’s Model Groundwater Law is a good example.
It has found no takers for the last 35 years because of
the virtual impossibility of reasonable enforcement.
Also, if made into a law, it is likely to create a whole new
rent seeking economy at the lower levels of bureaucracy
without any benefit to water resources or its users. On
the other hand, we frequently see updates on India’s
Water Policy (1987, 1992, and 2005) which are easily
adopted because of their non-binding nature but
scarcely change anything on the ground; where, for
example, the difficult clauses like setting up of
inter-state river basin authorities are generally ignored.
In Africa, several countries have, during recent years,
experimented with demand management ideas – in
the guise of IWRM – such as pricing of water, instituting
water withdrawal permits, and restructuring regional
water departments as river basin organizations.
Although it may be too early to write a report on these,
countries like Ghana are already having second
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booming groundwater markets reduce the farmers’ stake
in improving the public irrigation system. In addition,
there are conflicts of interest between head and tail reach
farmers. All these factors increase the transaction cost of
community management. Relatively low value of
produce and the fact that reforms often come with higher
irrigation fee and greater management responsibilities
reduce the potential pay-offs of farmers. No wonder, there
exists little evidence of it having succeeded anywhere in
India except on an experimental scale, that too with
unreplicable facilitation.
Vibrant  but  ignored  institutional
innovations (Quadrant I)
India’s water sector is brimming with spontaneous
institutional innovations that reduce transaction costs
and create welfare but are largely ignored or even
discouraged by the formal institutional players. Most of
these institutions are swayambhoo (spontaneous) and
have acquired large enough scale to allow generalization.
These are enterprises to reduce transaction costs,
improve welfare and raise productivity. They exist to
serve the interest of their participants and not the
overall society.
A leading example is that of shared tubewells.
Thousands were built across the country, often with
World Bank support, to provide affordable groundwater
irrigation to small farmers who could not afford a pump
of their own. Most of these proved to be white elephants
costing a fortune for providing an indifferent service to
a fraction of their design command areas. Efforts to
transfer their management to user cooperatives failed
to take-off for decades because transaction costs were
much higher compared to the pay-offs. At the same
time, farmers in north Gujarat were building and
operating thriving tubewell groups that allowed them
to chase groundwater to the bottom of the abyss. Their
operating rules and ownership structure were designed
to minimize transaction costs of cooperating on a
sustained basis. The whole dynamic of tubewell
transfer program changed in Gujarat when a new set of
rules removed the requirement of transfer only to a
registered cooperative and allowed small, informal
groups of major stakeholders to assume the role of
tubewell managers and residual claimants. Within three
years, more than half of the 3000 public tubewells were
transferred with all round positive impacts.
Opportunism is not the sole driver of swayambhoo
institutions. There are large scale examples of people’s
institutions driven by complex motives including
long-term collective self-interest. Saurashtra recharge
movement is a good example of such an instititution.
The movement was first catalyzed by stray experiments
of ‘barefoot hydrologists’ to modify open wells to collect
monsoonal flood waters. Early successes fired the
imagination of people and religious leaders of sects like
Swadhyaya Pariwar and Swaminarayana Sampradaya
ennobled this work in their public discourses by
imbuing it with a larger social purpose. The gathering
movement generated enormous local goodwill and
released philanthropic energies on an unprecedented
scale, with diamond merchants offering cash, cement
companies offering discounted prices, and communities
offering millions of days of voluntary labour. The
movement was multi-centric, unruly, spontaneous and
wholly self-funded until 1998, when the Government of
Gujarat piled on and proceeded to rid the movement of
its quintessentially swayambhoo  and voluntary
character by announcing a subsidy program. Like most
swayambhoo institutional developments, this one also
met with condescension from the scientific
establishment for its use of popular hydrology that paid
scant regard to the established tenets of how recharge
structures should be built and used. While there continue
to be serious doubts from the scientific community about
the effectiveness and sustainability of the recharge
structures built, the movement remains popular and
has spread to new areas.
These are examples of high pay-off, low transaction
cost institutions that are often looked down upon
by governments, NGOs, donors and research
establishments. As a result, instead of recognising the
potential of these institutions to the larger social goal,




The swayambhoo institutions of the kind discussed
above are therefore much better templates for what
kind of institutional change should be promoted
because they have a more natural, enduring and
scalable way of reducing transaction costs evident in
their spontaneous growth and self-propagating nature.
These ignored institutions offer six useful lessons
about how to make institutional change work in
developing country water sectors.
1. Instrumentality: Institutional arrangements that
thrive serve the purposes important to the agents
involved. Otherwise participants withold their
participation or even work to defeat the change
process. Therefore the importance of incentive
structures cannot be over-emphasized in designing
institutional change. Expecting popular
cooperation for institutions that require participants
to compromise their interests is naive.
2. Incentive Diffusion or Perversion: Even institutions
promising high pay-offs will fail to emerge if
transaction costs are concentrated in a few
stakeholders while incentives are diffused over a
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empirically that only a small fraction of the surplus
created by management improvement needs to be
concentrated in the manager to make it work.
3. High Cost of Self-Enforcement: Institutional setting
depends a great deal on quality and effectiveness of
enforcement. The transaction cost of institutional
change increases with increase in difficulty of
enforcement. Enforcement of rules and norms can
occur through self-imposed codes of conduct (first-
party enforcement), due to fear of retaliation against
transgressions (second-party enforcement) or with
the help of societal sanctions or coercive powers of
state (third-party enforcement). Of the three, the
second-party enforcement is the most difficult and
costly for change managers.
4. Structures of Incentives and of Sanction: Getting
incentives right so as to entice entrepreneurs to
undertake high pay-off activities is important but
not enough for catalyzing and sustainig desirable
institutional changes. It is equally important to
create a community sanction or authority structure
that enforces the rights of the service provider and
disciplines him at the same time. This protects
users and the service provider from the tyranny of
each other.
5. Institutional Environment: While the institutions
we discused are self-promoted, self-supported and
autonomous, they are influenced – both positively
and negatively – by workings of water policy, laws
and administration. The formal elements of the IE
affect both the kind of institutions that emerge and
their impacts. How well actors in the IE understand
extant and potential institutions, their net welfare
and productivity impacts and their backward and
forward linkages determines how much they can
influence or manage them.
6. Path-dependence: Institutional change is inherently
incremental and path-dependent. Therefore
transposing institutional models that worked
elsewhere in a different context seldom works. The
notion of ‘path-dependence’ has particular relevance
to popular institutional notions, such as the
Integrated River Basin Management, which have
worked in highly formalized water economies in
recent years. It is doubtful if such models would
work in the same way in the informal context
unless the local contexts are well understood and
accounted for.
Opportunities  for  policy  action
All the things that a Secretary of Water Resources at the
state or federal level is enjoined to do by the
current discourse to promote improved demand
management – imposing price on water resources (rather
than water service), enforcing a groundwater law, making
water the property of the state and stopping unlawful
diversion from nature, instituting water withdrawal
permits and assigning water entitlements, managing water
at river basin level – would be almost impossible to
implement in any meaningful scale in a predominantly
informal water economy. Instead, governments of low-
income countries should focus their effort on areas where
they can produce significant impacts:
1. Improve water infrastructure and services: This
already is a high priority and will remain so for a
long time even as opinion is turning against
investments in certain kinds of water infrastructure
such as irrigation projects. There are several issues
to be addressed such as mobilizing capital,
improving the coverage of user households
especially from poorer classes, cost recovery, and so
on. The point of attack, however, is the performance
of public systems, which has tended to be
abysmally low, be it irrigation systems or water
supply and sanitation systems.
2. Institutional reforms focused on incentive
concentration and transaction cost reduction: Public
system performance often responds strongly to
demand for better performance not from users but
from administrative or political leadership; however,
such performance gains are transient, and get
dissipated when demand slackens. To achieve
sustainable performance improvements,
institutional innovations are needed that restructure
incentives and reduce transaction costs.
3. Honing and using indirect instruments and
strategies for achieving public policy objectives: In
its enthusiasm for direct management of water
demand, the current discourse is overlooking
numerous opportunities to achieve comparable
aims using indirect instruments. For instance,
Electricity Boards can play a key role in
groundwater demand management through
pricing and rationing of electricity to tubewells.
4. Undertake vigorous demand management in
formal or formalizing segments: Finally, pricing
and full cost recovery, tight water law and
regulations, and water rights and entitlements are
definitely indicated in the predominantly formal
segments of the water economy. These are to be
found in cities, excluding the slums and shanty
towns; and in the industrial sector where users are
large and easily identifiable.
To summarize, cookbook style replication of successful
models from developed and formal economies is unlikely
to work in the largely informal, developing country water
economies. Such mindless replication, besides being
ineffective, diverts policy attention and scarce public
resources away from the real issues. The key to successful
IWRM is integration – of the local resources and in the
local context – which requires a thorough understanding
of how the local context is different from more developed
water economies. The policy challenge, therefore, is
eschewing initiatives that are unimplementable and fitting
policies to their context.
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